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ABSTRACT
Intellectual property rights have evolved over the years with the intention of protecting
novelty and innovation of ideas while creating a competitive market, at both a local
and global level. The strongest tools to achieve this end have arguably been patents –
protecting inventions that are novel, non-obvious and demonstrate utility. Most
countries give a protection term of twenty years from the date of filing a valid
submission. In the field of pharmaceuticals, foods and agrochemicals, marketing of
products requires statutory clearances from the appropriate national regulatory bodies,
in order to ensure that the products satisfy certain minimum criteria of quality and
safety. Generating such data generally involves elaborate experimentation, trials in
various phases, chemical analysis, and an estimation of the impact on the environment,
all of which are time-consuming and expensive processes. Thus the intellectual property
right of data exclusivity becomes important, as it involves the question of whether
these processes, once completed, can be taken advantage of by other applicants. This
paper analyses the concept of data exclusivity, studying article 39 of TRIPS, and
addresses the question of whether data exclusivity laws should be introduced in India.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The pharmaceutical industry can be said to comprise of pioneer and generic
companies: the former develop and market new drugs and the latter copy some
or all aspects of those drugs and sell them.1 Data exclusivity, also known as
marketing exclusivity, refers to a practice whereby, for a fixed period of time,
drug regulatory authorities do not allow the registration files of a pioneer company
to be used to register a therapeutically equivalent generic version of that
medicine.2 It other words, during a set period of time, data exclusivity would
prevent a pharmaceutical applicant from obtaining a marketing authorisation
for its drug through a facilitated procedure entailing reliance on preclinical and
clinical data generated by a previous applicant to support a successful application
for its own drug, where the drugs manufactured by both applicants are effectively
the same and thus can be approved or rejected by taking the same data into
account.3 Thus, data exclusivity guarantees additional market protection for
originator pharmaceutical companies4 by preventing health authorities from
accepting applications for generic medicines during the period of exclusivity.
1

Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exclusivity under United States and European Union Law, 59 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 479, 479 (2004).

2

Praveen Dalal, Data Exclusivity: An Indian Perspective, at http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/
article.asp?id=12300.

3

Id.

4

An ‘originator pharmaceutical’, as opposed to a generic pharmaceutical company, is one which produces
a new, original drug, rather than producing a generic equivalent of an already produced drug.
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During the limited period of exclusivity, the second entrant can obtain
marketing approval only if it generates its own data supporting the safety and
efficacy of its drug. The practical consequence is that generic competition is
delayed for the duration of marketing exclusivity.5 Protection of registration
data, through the data exclusivity that results from non-reliance on the data, is
a governmental function. The registration data is provided to the authorities in
confidence and is not meant to be referred to by third parties. Further,
governments should be required to protect the data that they receive in a manner
that will enable the originators to enforce their rights.6 It is thus the government,
through its regulatory agencies, and not the originator of the data, that is
responsible for preventing copiers from taking advantage of proprietary data
during the period of data exclusivity.
A. Data Exclusivity as a Separate Intellectual Property Right
Data exclusivity is often considered to be an extension of the rights under
a patent. However, it is important to note the distinction between the two
rights, as data exclusivity qualifies as an independent intellectual property right.
Patents and data exclusivities are awarded independently. Unlike a patent,
which gives the holder the right to exclude others from making, using, selling,
offering for sale, or importing the patented product, the protection that
governments must accord proprietary test data does not prevent any
manufacturer from running its own tests and submitting the results to the
regulatory authorities. Assuming the absence of any intervening patents, a
generic alternative may still receive marketing approval, provided that the
generic manufacturer conducts its own preclinical and clinical trials and
independently seeks marketing authorisation by the regulatory bodies.7 For
instance, the drug’s patent may expire or be ruled invalid before marketing
approval and marketing exclusivity are granted. Similarly, if a valid patent covers
the pioneer drug, it effectively prevents generic entry, whether or not a marketing
exclusivity period is running.8 Data exclusivity also differs from a patent in that
5

Dalal, supra note 2.

6

INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFRS. ASS’NS, ENCOURAGEMENT OF NEW CLINICAL DRUG DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF
DATA EXCLUSIVITY 15 (2000), http://www.ifpma.org/documents/NR83/DataExclusivity.pdf.

7

Id. at 3.

8

Id.
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it is not a right that the pioneer firm can invoke directly against a generic firm.9
In particular, the pioneer firm cannot directly challenge the second entrant to
whom the agency would have mistakenly granted marketing approval, despite
an ongoing marketing exclusivity, as data exclusivity merely protects the data
given to the agency in order to approve the product, unlike a patent, which
protects the product itself.10 Thus, data exclusivity and patents are distinct forms
of protection – the protection of one right is neither dependent nor linked to
the other in any intrinsic way.11
B. The Advantages of Data Exclusivity
The purpose of data exclusivity is to ensure that the initial registrant of a
new drug can recover the costs of testing the drug for efficacy and safety. Extensive
testing directly translates into considerable costs for generating the data necessary
to obtain approval of each new active ingredient. Drug developers contend
that they cannot afford to bring drugs to market without data exclusivity because
later registrants, who did not have to invest in the high cost of obtaining
marketing approval, can free-ride on the initial registrant’s approval and sell
the same or similar drug at a lower price.12
One argument for data exclusivity laws is that pharmaceutical manufacturers
will have a greater incentive to develop drugs for diseases that are considerably
more prevalent in developing countries, as incentives based solely on sales in
developed countries will not encourage the creation and testing of these products
if the market for them in the developed countries is limited. This is premised on
the assumption that a lack of data exclusivity in a certain country would make
9

See Junod, supra note 1, at 493.

10

Id.

11

See, e.g., Organon v. Teva, 244 F. Supp. 2d 370, 373 (D.N.J. 2002); see also id, at 482 (noting that a
drug’s patent may expire or be ruled invalid before marketing approval and marketing exclusivity are
granted, or, similarly, that a valid patent covering a pioneer drug effectively prevents generic entry,
whether or not a marketing exclusivity period is running); INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFRS. ASS’NS, supra
note 6, at 15 (“Data exclusivity is an independent intellectual property right and should not be
confused with the protection provided by other rights, especially patents.”).

12

G. Lee Skillington, The Protection of Test and Other Data Required by Article 39(3) of TRIPS, 24 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 8 (2003) (“Estimates of costs vary widely, but studies by the Tufts Center for the
Study of Drug Development indicate that the costs of developing a new drug [were] $54 million in
1976 (in 1976 U.S. dollars), $231 million in 1991 (in 1991 U.S. dollars), and $802 million in 2002
(in 2002 U.S. dollars).” (footnote omitted)).
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it very difficult for the pioneer manufacturer to recover the expenses associated
with research and testing in that country, as subsequent generic manufacturers
would be able to undercut its prices by copying the pioneer’s drug after the
patent expires and reusing the pioneer’s data in order to obtain approval, thus
reducing costs significantly.13
II. DATA EXCLUSIVITY UNDER TRIPS
Proponents of data exclusivity argue that it is mandated in the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).14 The
controversy surrounding data exclusivity has in large measure been related to
the different interpretations given to the relevant provisions of TRIPS.
Section 7 of TRIPS is entitled Protection of Undisclosed Information, and
article 39 therein talks about data exclusivity.15 TRIPS introduced the first
international standard on the subject. Article 39(1) talks about protecting
member states against unfair competition16 and article 39(2) states that natural
and legal persons have the possibility of preventing information lawfully within
their control from being disclosed to others without their consent in a manner

13

Id. at 13-14.

14

Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,
1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994);
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].

15

TRIPS, supra note 14, at art. 39.

16

Article 39(1) reads: “In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as
provided in article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect undisclosed information
in accordance with paragraph 2 below and data submitted to governments or governmental agencies
in accordance with paragraph 3 below”. Id. at art. 39(1). Article 10bis of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, as last revised at the Stockholm
Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter Paris Convention], requires all
countries of the Paris Union to provide all nationals of the Union with effective protection against
unfair competition, and this protection must be provided on a ‘national treatment’ basis pursuant to
article 2.
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contrary to honest commercial practices.17 Article 39(3) is the provision directly
concerning data exclusivity and reads as follows:18
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of
a pharmaceutical or of agricultural or chemical products which utilise
new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data,
the origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such
data against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect
such data against disclosure, except when necessary to protect the public,
or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against
unfair commercial use.
On the face of it, it seems that this provision mandates data exclusivity.
The structure of article 39 suggests that the negotiating parties conceived of
the regime for test data as a particular case in the framework of the protection of
undisclosed information.19 However, the article must be carefully scrutinized
keeping in mind its legislative history and intention. TRIPS is not a uniform
law and it only establishes broad parameters for national rules for different
members. The inclusion of test data in TRIPS as a category of intellectual
property does not permit one to draw any conclusion about the nature of the
protection conferred.20 The question that then arises is how much freedom
TRIPS allows WTO members to apply different approaches for test data
protection, and to what extent a competitive model without exclusivity would
17

Article 39(2) states that “natural and legal persons” should be able to prevent “information lawfully
within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in
a manner contrary to honest commercial practices” as long as the information in question is a “secret”
under sub-clause (a), “has commercial value because it is secret”, and “has been subject to reasonable
steps under circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret”.
TRIPS, supra note 14, at art. 39(2).

18

Id. at art. 39(3). The proviso to the article states:
For the purpose of this provision, “a manner contrary to honest commercial practices” shall mean at least
practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and includes the
acquisition of undisclosed information by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to
know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition.

19

Carlos M. Correa, Unfair Competition under TRIPS: Protection of Data Submitted for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 69, 72 (2002).

20

Id. at 70.
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be compatible with the minimum standards set out by article 39(3).21 This calls
for an analysis of article 39(3) and its possible interpretations.
A. An Analysis of Article 39(3)
1. Data Necessary for Marketing Approval
Article 39(3) makes it clear that the first condition for its application is
that a member state stipulates data submission as a condition for obtaining
marketing approval for pharmaceuticals or agrochemical products. Thus, the
obligation to protect test data only arises in the member states where national
regulations require the submission of such data. If a member state opts not to
require this data, article 39(3) will naturally not apply.22
2. Undisclosed Data
To qualify for protection under article 39(3), the pertinent information
must be undisclosed. This means that information that is already public (due to
publication in a scientific journal or magazine, for example) does not fall within
its scope. Any requirement for the submission of published or otherwise disclosed
information to national regulators shall not generate any private right limiting
the use of such information by the government or third parties, since the
information is already available to the public.23
3. New Chemical Entities
Another important condition for the application of article 39(3) is that
the data must refer to a ‘new chemical entity’. TRIPS, however, does not define
the term ‘new’.24 Proponents of data exclusivity argue that article 39(3) protects
data and products involved in the marketing approval systems. The word “new”
thus refers to the status of a chemical entity within the marketing approval
system, not with respect to the state of the art or novelty in the patent sense.25
21

Id.

22

Id. at 73.

23

Id. at 73.

24

Id. at 74.

25

See id.
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A chemical entity may be deemed new in the absence of any prior application
for approval of the same drug, or if the same drug has not previously used in
commerce.26 However, one could also argue that article 39(3) refers to a chemical
entity that was not found within the marketing system at the time of submission.
Therefore, only data related to products with chemical entities that were not
publicly known before the submission of the data would be eligible for
protection.27
Since TRIPS avoids defining the term ‘new chemical entity’, there is no
way of declaring one interpretation as superior to the others, and thus member
countries have a certain degree of leeway in their implementation concerning
this area. Thus, to argue that the definition of a ‘new chemical entity’ would
include a new therapeutic use of an old drug, an argument that holds sway in
developed countries like the USA, would amount to giving a strained meaning
to a provision that allows for flexibility. In fact, article 39(3) would not apply in
cases where approval is sought for new indications, dosage forms, combinations,
new forms of administration, crystalline forms, isomers, etc. of existing drugs,
since there would be no novel chemical entity involved.28 This is because the
new product will be intrinsically similar to the previous product and will not
require data exclusivity protection.29
4. Considerable Effort
Article 39(3) mandates protection when the process of obtaining the data
involved a “considerable effort”. However, the article is vague about the type of
effort (technical or economic) involved or the magnitude of it that would be
deemed considerable. The term may be interpreted to mean the concentrated
26

Id.

27

See id.

28

Id. at 75.

29

See Case C-368/96, The Queen v. Licensing Auth. established by the Medicines Act 1968, ex parte
Generics (U.K.) Ltd, 1998 E.C.R. I-7967, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 181, 220 (1998). The Court held that
a second product is essentially similar to an earlier approved product if the second product has the same
qualitative and quantitative composition in terms of active principles, the same pharmaceutical form
and is bio-equivalent to the first product, unless it is apparent in the light of scientific knowledge that
it differs significantly from the original product as regards safety or efficacy. In these cases, the original
applicant does not receive new periods of so-called “marketing exclusivity” for each new indication,
dosage form, or dosage schedule.
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or special activities, physical or mental, that are extensive in scope or duration.30
Inclusion of this standard also suggests that national regulatory authorities may
call for the applicant to prove that the information for which protection is
sought is the outcome of considerable effort.
5. Unfair Commercial Use
The interpretation of this phrase has by far given rise to the maximum
debate concerning data exclusivity. The non-disclosure obligation under article
39 requires that the test data not be disclosed unless steps are taken to ensure
that the data is protected against “unfair commercial use”. Here, the key questions
are: what constitutes unfair commercial use, and how can that protection be
guaranteed? If the government authority relies on the dossier of the pioneer
manufacturer in order to grant permission to a generic manufacturer, does this
amount to unfair commercial use?
Developed nations argue that a member state’s reliance, at or without the
request of a competitor of the originator of data, on data submitted by the
originator in a manner that benefits the competitor, would constitute unfair
commercial use of the data.31 Their argument states that any reliance on the
data by a competitor before the originator has had the opportunity to recoup
the costs associated with the considerable efforts to develop the data would be
unfair, as it would give the competitor a free ride on the investment made by
the originator. However, since there is no absolute or universal rule to determine
when certain practices should be deemed unfair, it is likely that different
countries will judge the fairness of certain situations differently, depending on
their values and competitive advantages.32 If the drafters of TRIPS had intended
the obligation to be fulfilled by the creation of such a private right, they would
have expressly required the member states to give submitters a private right of
action.33 Article 39(3) could have certainly adopted a stance proscribing reliance
30

Skillington, supra note 12, at 28.

31

Id. at 29.

32

Id. (“Some countries may consider it an unfair practice for a follower company to commercially benefit
from the data produced by the originator via a marketing approval system based on similarity … In
others, it may be regarded as the legitimate exploitation of an externality created during legitimate
competition in the market.”).

33

Id. at 22.
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on clinical data and specifying a time period for protection. The U.S. had in
fact made such a proposal in the TRIPS negotiations, but the proposal was not
incorporated into the final text of TRIPS.34 Article 39(3) can be clearly
distinguished from the more explicit provision in the earlier NAFTA agreement,
in which disclosure and reliance of clinical data is specifically proscribed, and a
minimum exclusivity period of five years is stated.35
One of the most important rules of statutory interpretation is that what is
not explicitly included is thereby excluded (expressio unis est exclusio alterius).36
Keeping this rule in mind, the drafters of TRIPS certainly had the opportunity
to impose more specific requirements of data exclusivity, but chose not to do so.
Thus, contrary to those who argue that article 39(3) mandates data exclusivity,
it is entirely consistent with the language of the article to simply require that
data submitted for drug approval be kept confidential by the government
authority while allowing the authority to rely on this data to approve subsequent
generic applications.
B. Summary
In sum, article 39(3) clearly requires some form of protection for test data,
but does not require member states to grant exclusive rights. Its main purpose is
not to prevent the use of such data by governments, but to prevent unfair use
by competitors. The language, context, principles of statutory interpretation
and purpose of the article do not support an interpretation that the required
protection can be implemented only on the basis of exclusivity rights. This
interpretation is confirmed by the history of the negotiation of TRIPS. The
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has also
stated that “authorities are not prevented [under article 39(3)]… from using

34

Correa, supra note 19, at 77.

35

North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.- U.S., art. 1711, 32 I.L.M. 605,
675 [hereinafter NAFTA].

36

82 C.J.S. § 323; ABC Laminart v. AP Agencies Salem, (1989) 2 S.C.C. 163 (applying the maxim in
India); Gilmore (Valuation Officer) v. Baker-Carr, [1962] 1 W.L.R. 1165 (CA) (applying the maxin
in the U.K.); West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991) (applying the maxim in
the U.S.).
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knowledge and data, for instance, to assess subsequent applications by third
parties for the registration of similar products.37
The correct interpretation that must be given to article 39 is quite clear
and unambiguous at this point. TRIPS does not make granting of data exclusivity
rights mandatory, but gives the member states the freedom to choose the nature
and extent of protection they want to offer.
However, the question of whether India should grant data exclusivity is
quite separate from what the interpretation of article 39 is. TRIPS gives a country
the option to choose whether or not to grant data exclusivity rights. The question
as to whether or not a country should actually grant this right to pharmaceutical
companies is a totally separate one, and that answer must be arrived at on its
own merits and is not linked to the interpretation of article 39 of TRIPS.38
III. DATA EXCLUSIVITY LAWS IN NORTH AMERICA
AND THE EU
Although courts across jurisdictions have not dealt with data exclusivity
rights extensively, two relevant cases throw some light on the nature and extent
of data protection rights. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,39 the U.S. Supreme
Court described the extensive practice of relying on data submitted by the first
applicant in the U.S. and recognised that the relevant authority could use the
data submitted by the originator to assess second-entrant applications.
According to the law applicable at the time of the complaint, the applicant was
entitled to compensation, but not to exclusive use of the data. On the other
37

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, TRIPS AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(UNCTAD/ITE/1) 48 (1996).

38

It is crucial to understand this distinction as it negates the claims that as signatory to TRIPS, India is
obligated to grant data exclusivity rights.

39

467 U.S. 986 (1984). The Ruckelshaus case relates to the protection of data submitted for the registration
of an agro-chemical product. Though a subsequent applicant was obliged to compensate for the use of
Monsanto’s original data, Monsanto argued that such use undermined its reasonable investmentbacked expectations and was unconstitutional. The basic argument of the plaintiff was that the
possibility given to a competitor by US law of using the data submitted for the registration of a product
without compensation nullified the data originator’s “reasonable investment-backed expectation”,
which the court upheld.
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hand, in Bayer, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General),40 the General Court of Appeal
of Canada decided, despite the fact that NAFTA provides for a minimum term
of exclusivity, that the approval of a subsequent application on the basis of a
prior registration was legitimate.41 The Court observed that the health authority
neither requested undisclosed information a second time nor examined it; the
authority just checked whether the original and subsequent products were
indeed the same.42 The issue was decided under Canadian law and NAFTA
article 1711.43 The Court held that if the authority does not actually examine
and rely on that confidential or trade secret information on behalf of the generic
manufacturer, there is no use of data, and hence the exclusivity provision is not
applicable.44
The popular argument in the USA and the EU nations is that data
exclusivity is a mandatory right that must be granted by member states under
TRIPS, since the manufacturer that developed the test data has invested heavily
and deserves a fair return on investment. Where patent law fails to provide
40

Bayer, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), [1999] 243 N.R. 170 (Fed. Ct.) (Can.).

41

Correa, supra note 19, at 80.

42

Id.

43

The relevant portion of article 1711 reads:
(5) If a Party requires, as a condition for approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or agricultural
chemical products that utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data
necessary to determine whether the use of such data involves considerable effort, the Party shall protect
against disclosure of the data of persons making such submission, where the origination of such data
involve considerable efforts, except where the disclosure is necessary to protect the public or unless steps
are taken to ensure that the data is protected against unfair commercial use.
(6) Each Party shall provide that for data subject to paragraph 5 that are submitted to the Party after the
date of entry into force of this Agreement, no person other than the person that submitted them may,
without the latter’s permission, rely on such data in support of an application for the product approval
during a reasonable period of time after their submission. For this purpose, a reasonable period shall
normally mean not less than five years from the date on which the Party granted approval to the person that
produced the data for approval to market its product, taking account of the nature of the data and the
person’s efforts and expenditures in producing them. Subject to this provision, there shall be no limitation
on any Party to implement abbreviated approval procedures for such products on the basis of bioequivalence
and bioavailability studies.
(7) Where a Party relies on a marketing approval granted by another Party, the reasonable period of
exclusive use of the data submitted in connection with obtaining the approval relied on shall begin with the
date of the first marketing approval relied on.
NAFTA, supra note 35, art. 1711.

44

Correa, supra note 19, at 80.
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protection unless data exclusivity is granted, proponents of data exclusivity argue
that competitors would face no barrier to producing and registering an exact
copy of the product.45 In the EU, Council Directive 65/6546 provides a period
of data protection of either six or ten years, depending on the member state
concerned: the larger member states provide ten years, while the smaller provide
only six years. However, for products that are approved through the centralised
procedure, Regulation 2309/9347 provides a ten-year period of data protection.
During this period of time, the regulatory authorities cannot approve any
applications that seek to rely on the originator’s data.48 The U.S. law has
changed since Ruckelshaus, with the passing of the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,49 otherwise known as the HatchWaxman Act, and in such a scenario the authorities now would be unable to
rely on the plaintiff’s data. U.S. law now specifically provides that a subsequent
applicant cannot use the initial applicant’s safety and efficacy data that the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) relies upon for approval for five years
after the initial date of approval.50 Furthermore, there is no requirement that
the pharmaceutical product be patented, have current patent protection, or
even be patentable.51 Thus, the law protects non-patentable products or products
whose patent protection will terminate before the five-year exclusivity period
45

Carlos María Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO System for Access to
Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79, 83 (2004).

46

Council Directive 65/65/EEC, 1965 O.J. (No. 22) 368, reprinted in 1965-1966 O.J. SPEC. ED. 20
(1972).

47

Council Regulation 2309/93 of 22 July 1993, 1993 O.J. (L 214) 1 (laying down Community procedures
for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing
a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products).

48

INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFRS. ASS’NS, supra note 6, at 3-4. The new system adopted by the European
Parliament in December 2003 employs an “8+2+1” period of data protection for all member states,
granting an initial eight years of data protection for the dossier of an innovative pharmaceutical
product. Subsequent to this, a generic company may manufacture and register an analogous drug, but
cannot commercialize it until the end of the tenth year. This may be extended by one year if any new
indications are discovered for the innovative drug. David Childs, The World Health Organization’s
Prequalification Program and its Potential Effect on Data Exclusivity Laws, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 79, 81
(2005).

49

35 U.S.C. § 156 (1988). The Act prohibits competitors from relying on the data submitted by the
originator for a five-year period after approval of the product associated with the data, if the product
contains an active ingredient that had not been previously approved by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration.

50

21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D)(ii).

51

See id.
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expires.52 However, an initial applicant may set up financial arrangements with
subsequent applicants to use the dossier in attempts to secure marketing
approval.53 Applicants can obtain a ‘right of reference’ from the initial applicant,
as per which permission is given by the initial applicant to rely on its data, after
which the beneficiary of this right can submit its application regardless of
marketing exclusivity.54 Further, as a balance of incentives to first entrants in
the markets, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides an extension of patent term for
first products. Where a drug is approved by the FDA and a patent exists covering
the drug, its use, or manufacture, an extension of the patent term can be granted,
proportional to the period needed for regulatory approval of the product.55
However, infectious diseases kill over ten million people each year, more
than ninety per cent of whom are in the developing world.56 The magnitude of
this crisis has drawn attention to the fact that millions of people in the developing
world do not have access to the medicines that are needed to treat disease or
alleviate suffering.57 The reasons for the lack of access to essential medicines are
manifold, but in many cases the high prices of drugs are a barrier to needed
treatments.58 The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, 2001,
emphasised that TRIPS should be interpreted and implemented in a manner
that supports WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in particular,
to promote access to medicines for all.59 For these reasons, various developing
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nations as well as human rights groups and NGOs argue that TRIPS does not
mandate granting of data exclusivity rights. These polarising viewpoints have
given rise to extensive debate about data exclusivity in various jurisdictions,
including India.
IV. DATA EXCLUSIVITY: AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE
A. The Current Legal Regime
The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (DCA) regulates the import,
manufacture, distribution and sale of drugs in India. The right of a manufacturer
to market a drug arises upon the grant of a licence under the DCA and the
Drugs & Cosmetics Rules, 1945. In 1988, major changes were introduced in
the DCA to regulate the granting of approval of new drugs for manufacture or
import.60 Part X-A was added for the regulation of import of manufacture of
new drugs including biological and special products. Rule 122-E gave a new
and much wider definition of the term ‘new drug’.61 Irrespective of the fact that
the safety and efficacy of a drug is established in another country, fresh data as
to its safety must be submitted in India, but the level of clinical trials depends
on the status of the drug in other countries.62 Further amendments were made
in 2001 to deal with requirements of subsequent approval, and Appendix 1-A
was added to Schedule Y63 as per which the entry of generic drugs is made
relatively easy and expeditious under DCA. Generic manufacturers are only
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required to prove that the generic version is bio-equivalent to the original drug.64
They are not bound to provide any other data mentioned in Schedule Y. This
in turn allows them to enter the market quickly with cheaper generic
alternatives. Thus, data with considerable effort is only insisted in case of new
drugs introduced in the market for the first time.65 This position is evidently in
contradiction with the objective of data exclusivity. Under the Insecticides
Act, 1968, any subsequent applicant for registration of the same insecticide has
to be granted registration on the same conditions as imposed for the original
registration. In other words, the subsequent applicant need not give data proving
the efficacy and safety of the insecticide. He has to submit only the chemical
composition and leaflets that were approved for the original registrant.66
Under pressure from various interest groups, the government has recently
been considering proposals to amend the DCA in favour of data exclusivity. It
is proposed to add a new section 18A for prohibition and liability for disclosure
of information and to amend the Rules.67 For approval under subsection (1) of
the new section, the licensing authorities may ask for submission of undisclosed
information by the applicant. Under sub-clause (2), the licensing authority will
have to keep undisclosed information submitted for new drugs, unless the
government by notification seeks disclosure of such information in public
interest.68 In addition, the Organization of Pharmaceutical Producers of India
has requested the Government to amend Schedule Y of the DCA to include a
provision for data exclusivity for a period of six years from the date of marketing
approval.69
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B. Arguments in Favour of Data Exclusivity in India
As mentioned earlier, drug developers contend that they cannot introduce
new drugs in the market without data exclusivity laws to protect their interests.
Proponents of data exclusivity refer to the success of the Hatch-Waxman Act
in the USA, which has so far resulted in dramatic benefits for consumers. Within
three years of its enactment, fifty-four more new drugs were under development
and testing – far more than the total number of orphan drugs in the market on
the date of enactment.70 As of January 2001, a total of 212 orphan drugs had
been approved, with another 855 drugs as candidates for development.71 Hence,
introduction of data exclusivity would end up benefiting the consumers in a big
way. Furthermore, one of the most significant problems for developing countries
like India is the formulation of products directed at diseases or conditions that
are not normally found in developed countries. Drugs catering to the needs in
India will only be developed if data exclusivity laws exist in India. It is only
when sufficient protection is accorded to drug manufacturers that they will
come to India and spend their resources and time on developing drugs for diseases
endemic to India. Another argument is that granting a reasonable data
exclusivity period will make India an attractive destination for research and
development work.72 Given these reasons, and international pressure as well as
demands from the pioneer pharmaceutical industries, should India make way
for a data exclusivity regime? To answer this question, let us examine the demerits
of introducing data exclusivity in India.
C. Why Say No to Data Exclusivity?
Most drug manufacturers in India work only on generic drugs.73 If data
exclusivity is approved, domestic enterprises would be prevented from obtaining
marketing approvals on the basis of the data submitted by the first enterprise
that had generated and submitted the data. There are various reasons why data
exclusivity rights should not be granted in India.
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Firstly, there seems to be no clear economic justification as to why data
exclusivity should be granted to firms that already avail a patent protection
term of twenty years globally for their products. The Patents Act, 1970, was
recently amended by the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, introducing many
changes favourable to the pharmaceutical industry, including re-introduction
of product patents for drugs, medicines, and foods, including products of chemical
reactions.74 The patent term has been made twenty years from the date of
submission of the complete specification. New and wider definitions of terms
relevant to the pharmaceutical industry have been given under the amended
Act. Indian companies such as Dr. Reddy’s, Sunpharma and Cipla are also of
the view that data exclusivity will prolong the monopoly already given by product
patents.75
If the generic industry in India is curbed further, a large amount of cheap
supply of medicines at very competitive prices will be seriously affected. In
practice, data exclusivity terms, since they are granted from the date of
introduction of a particular product in a given market, may have the effect of
extending the monopoly term of the patent holder beyond the term of the
patent and delaying the entry of generics.76 A hypothetical situation could help
in explaining this argument. Assuming Indian law granted data exclusivity for
five years, this would mean that a patent granted for a product in 1995 would
be valid until 2015 under the amended Patents Act. However, if this product
were introduced in the Indian market only in 2011, then data exclusivity in
Indian law would protect the regulatory data submitted by the company until
2016 thus delaying the entry of generics, and extending the product monopoly
for another year beyond the patent period.77
Secondly, India is a major supplier of the world’s generic medicines and
exports two-thirds of its generic drugs to developing countries. The excellent
capability of Indian pharmaceutical industry to produce generic drugs at
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affordable cost is a well-established fact.78 These exports are critical for addressing
and treating a great number of public health illnesses and in the global fight
against AIDS.79 India has been largely responsible for reducing the prices of
antiretroviral drugs by as much as 98%.80 Thus, Indian generic manufacturing
clearly plays a vital role in the global fight against diseases.81 If data exclusivity
rights are granted, this respectable status that India enjoys in the eyes of the
developing world would certainly be lost and new data exclusivity provisions
may have a disastrous affect on health conditions worldwide.
Thirdly, the research-based pharmaceutical industry claims that data
exclusivity provides incentives for companies to generate the necessary data,
since without marketing exclusivity, brand-name companies would not want
to conduct expensive preclinical tests and clinical trials.82 This argument is
flawed because pharmaceutical companies do not need incentives to produce
preclinical and clinical test data because they have no choice in that matter:
they must supply this information if they want to sell their drugs.83 Preclinical
testing and clinical trials are a requisite for any new drug marketing application.84
In India, the tests have to be supplied to the Drug Controller General of India
(DCGI), whether or not marketing exclusivity is granted.
Fourthly, one of the perceived gains of data exclusivity is an increase in
foreign direct investment in the pharmaceutical sector and the arrival of newer
medicines for Indian patients. The argument that data exclusivity laws will
encourage the introduction of new medicines into the Indian market betrays a
misunderstanding of their implications. In fact, there is a possibility that data
exclusivity would actually provide incentives to delay the entry of new products
78
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for MNCs would prefer to keep prices high in developed markets by delaying
their entry into the developing world at lower prices.85 This is because
introducing the drugs in developing countries at lower prices will invariably
lead to a fall in their price globally also. To preserve that high price, new drugs
would only be introduced after a delay in developing countries.
Fifthly, data exclusivity would render redundant the use of a compulsory
licence, a market exclusivity waiver on patents provided by TRIPS in the event
of a health emergency. A compulsory licence is the instrument available in
India to curb the abuse of monopoly by multinational companies. The
government can issue such a licence after three years of the grant of the patent,
if it is found that the patented drug is not available, or it is too expensive, or the
development of domestic industry or an expert market is hampered. However,
if data exclusivity laws are introduced, they may act at cross purposes with
compulsory licences, because the DGCI may have to ask Indian companies to
conduct fresh clinical trials before getting marketing approval.86 There is a
possibility that the domestic sector may not be able to duplicate even its own
data for getting marketing approval even when the companies may be granted
a compulsory licence for meeting the demands for some patented products.87
Sixthly, in order to enter even small and marginally profitable markets, generic
competitors would be required to duplicate expensive and time-consuming
clinical trials in order to establish safety, quality, and efficacy. Another concern
is that animals and other research subjects are dangerously exploited if the second
applicant has to replicate studies already performed by the pioneer company.88
If the same agency has approved a drug based on clinical data provided by one
company, there is no logical reason why the same drug should be refused
marketing approval if another company produces it.
Finally, currently, the DCA defines ‘new drug’ requiring regulatory approval
as something much wider in scope than ‘new chemical entity’, including drugs
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“proposed to be marketed with modified or new claims, namely, indications,
dosage, dosage form … route of administration.”89 If the data exclusivity law is
enacted as mandatory for all ‘new drugs’ as presently defined under the DCA,
drug companies will be able to enjoy de facto monopoly rights over trivial changes
that may not even be patentable under patent laws for lack of inventiveness,
but still qualify as new drug under the DCA. This can arguably constitute
protection to an unreasonable extent for pioneer pharmaceutical companies.
The extension of intellectual property beyond its boundaries, so as to protect
investment and not intellectual contributions, disrupts the essence of a system
conceived to reward the creators of original ideas and new inventions.
V. CONCLUSION
Considering the fact that various interest groups are seeking amendments
in Indian law to introduce data exclusivity provisions, the issue is a crucial one.
As noted above, there are several reasons why data exclusivity laws should not
be brought into India at this stage. An analysis of article 39 of TRIPS and its
legislative history indicates that TRIPS speaks of data protection in a flexible
manner, and does not mandate data protection to be implemented by bringing
in a data exclusivity regime. Thus, the argument that data exclusivity must be
provided for in Indian law for India to be in compliance with TRIPS is fallacious.
Protection against “unfair commercial use” under TRIPS must be interpreted
to mean protection through non-disclosure and prohibiting others from accessing
test data for unfair commercial use. TRIPS gives member states the freedom to
choose the nature and extent of protection they want to offer. This
interpretation of TRIPS finds support from most Indian pharmaceutical
companies.90
Most Indian companies recognise the government’s use of data as an
exception and support allowing authorities enough discretion to use research
data for comparison with a subsequent product’s data.91 Use of pioneer data by
the authorities for granting approval to a subsequent product is not an unfair
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commercial use, but is a harmonious balance between public and private
interests, and is also the exercise of a sovereign function of the licensing authority.
The introduction of product patents in India has provided further protection
to pioneer manufacturing companies, and the generic industry in India as well
as the general health of ordinary citizens seems likely to suffer if data exclusivity
were brought into effect in India. Thus, it does not seem advisable to enact
data exclusivity laws in India or to amend the DCA or the Insecticides Act to
accommodate data exclusivity.
This, however, does not mean that no change at all is required in data
protection laws in India. While, a specific clause should be introduced that
allows the DCGI to demand undisclosed information for drug approval for
manufacture of generic drugs,92 at the same time, provisions creating obligations
on the part of the DCGI to keep the undisclosed information submitted to
them secret should be introduced so that information is not leaked to other
competing companies. While the Indian pharmaceutical sector is largely against
data exclusivity, it does support a stronger system of data protection in India.93
There is no express provision in the DCA or the Rules obligating the Drugs
Controller General of India to keep the data submitted to him under these laws
in confidence. Although Rule 53 creates an obligation on part of the Drugs
Inspector to keep the information supplied to him secret, this has not been
extended to the office of the DCGI.94 In the absence of such a provision, the
DCGI may not be covered by the Official Secrets Act, 1923 eiheeither. The
common law protection of trade secrets submitted to the authorities has not
extended to India through case law as of now.95 Thus, there seems to be a
lacuna in the law for ensuring protection of undisclosed information submitted
to the DCGI for approval. Strong trade secret protection laws are thus required
to fill this void and to satisfy the demands of the Indian pharmaceutical sector.
Thus, the DCA should be amended not to focus on data exclusivity but to
introduce mandatory provisions for ensuring the safety and quality of drugs.
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Until the Indian market reaches a stage at which data exclusivity laws will
be useful or conducive to the Indian pharmaceutical sector, the move to amend
the DCA and other laws to accommodate data exclusivity should therefore be
opposed, subject to the introduction of the changes recommended in this article.

